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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NASHVILLE DIVISION




v. ) Case No. 3:07-0645
) Judge Echols




Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’ s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order of 
September 19, 2008 (Docket Entry No. 85), to which Defendant has responded in opposition 
(Docket Entry No. 92). Also pending is Plaintiff’ s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order of 
September 17, 2008 (Docket Entry No. 90) which Defendant also opposes (Docket Entry No. 91).
I. DISCUSSION
This is an employment discrimination action brought under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq., and the Tennessee Handicap Act (“THA”), T.C.A. § 8-50­
103 in which the Court has previously denied cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 
Nos. 74 & 75). Plaintiff’ s claims arose after Wilson County Chancellor C. K. Smith (“Chancellor 
Smith”) entered certain rulings in Plaintiff’ s worker’s compensation case and Defendant then 
imposed certain restrictions on Plaintiff allegedly as a result of those rulings. At issue in the pending 
Objections are rulings made by the Magistrate Judge in relation to discovery sought by Plaintiff to
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which Defendant objected on the grounds of attorney client privilege and the attorney work product 
doctrine.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where a party objects to a discovery Order issued by the Magistrate Judge, this Court’s 
review is limited. “Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a district court 
judge find a magistrate judge's decisions concerning nondispositive matters ‘clearly erroneous’ 
before reversing any such decisions.” Chesher v. Allen, 122 Fed. Appx. 184, 187 (6th Cir. 2005). 
Reversal of a non-dispositive order is also appropriate where the Magistrate Judge’s ruling is 
“contrary to law.” Baker v. Peterson, 67 Fed. Appx. 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). “Contrary to law” 
is self-explanatory. A ruling is “clearly erroneous” when the reviewing court, after considering the 
entire matter, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See, United 
States v. Ellis, 497 F.3d 606, 611 (6th Cir. 2007).
B. MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 (Docket Entry No. 77)
Ray Coss (“Coss”) is an in-house attorney for Nissan who was deposed as Defendant’s Rule 
30(b)(6) witness on April 11, 2008. During the deposition, Defendant’s counsel objected to certain 
of the propounded questions and instructed Coss not to answer those questions on the grounds of 
attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. Plaintiff then filed a motion to 
compel Coss to respond to those questions which the Magistrate denied.
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling insofar as Coss was not required to testify 
about the substance of discussions at a July 25, 2006 meeting in which Chancellor Smith’s ruling 
was discussed and whether Coss undertook any research on the ADA in preparing for the meeting.
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Plaintiff argues the Magistrate Judge incorrectly concluded Coss’ primary role at the meeting was 
that of a legal advisor, instead of decision-maker with respect to the imposition of work restrictions 
on Plaintiff. Plaintiff also argues Defendant has waived the attorney-client privilege through the 
assertion it had an “honest belief’ its actions were taken in a good faith reliance on Chancellor 
Smith’s ruling. Given the standards governing this Court’s review of the Magistrate Judge’s Order, 
the Court rejects Plaintiff’ s arguments.
Communications between in-house counsel and an employer regarding an employee’s work 
accommodations or restrictions can constitute a legal opinion protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. See, Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000)(advice about an 
employee’s placement and an employer’s obligation under the ADA is “exactly the kind of legal 
advice the privilege was meant to protect”). While Plaintiff conclusorily asserts that the 
predominate propose of the July 25, 2006 meeting was to decide whether Defendant should impose 
restrictions on Plaintiff and whether Plaintiff should be allowed to continue working at Nissan 
(Docket Entry No. 90 at 6), this, perforce, does not mean that Coss’ primary role at the meeting was 
not that of in-house legal counsel. See, Ellis, 497 F.3d at 611 (where there are two permissible 
views of the evidence, a finding which supports one of those views cannot be clearly erroneous). 
Further, as in-house counsel, Coss would be expected to conduct research on applicable law, and 
“attorneys should be free to conduct research and prepare litigation strategies without fear that these 
preparations will be subject to review by outside parties.” In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 
511, 520 (6th Cir. 2006).
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Plaintiff also asserts Defendant waived the attorney-client privilege by invoking an “honest 
belief’ or good faith defense. Because this argument was not directly presented to the Magistrate 
Judge, the Court could reject it out-of-hand. See, Peebles v. Four Winds Int’l., 2008 WL 901550 
at *6 (W.D. Va. 2008). However, the Court has reviewed the argument and nevertheless rejects the 
same.
In support of his position that Defendant has waived the attorney-client privilege by virtue 
of its honest belief or good faith defense, Plaintiff relies upon cases which indicate that where a 
party is relying on advice of counsel as a defense, the attorney-client privilege may be waived 
because it goes directly to knowledge, and considerations of fairness to the adversary may warrant 
disclosure. See, John Doe Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 302 (2d Cir. 2003). However, such 
cases are inapposite because Defendant is not relying on the advice of counsel as its good faith 
defense. Quite the contrary, Defendant, in its Answer and Affirmative Defenses alleges that it 
“made good faith efforts based on information other than advice of counsel to comply with the laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability.” (Docket Entry No. 5 at 5 ^ 9).
Moreover, Plaintiff’ s suggestion that he has been placed at an unfair disadvantage because 
of Coss’ failure to respond to deposition questions is belied by the answers that were in fact given 
by Coss in his deposition. Coss answered questions about Nissan allegedly acting in a good faith 
effort to follow Chancellor Smith’s restrictions, Coss' determination that Chancellor Smith had 
imposed restrictions of no lifting, no use of power tools and no use of hand tools, and Coss’ belief 
that it was “unusual” for a court to impose permanent restrictions where the treating doctor had not 
recommended permanent restrictions. Coss also responded to questions about how he arrived at his
4
interpretation of Chancellor Smith’s decision, questions about what documents were distributed at 
the July 25, 2006 meeting, and the decision which was reached at that meeting. While Coss refused 
to answer questions about the substance of the discussions at the July 25, 2006 meeting (and the 
substance of an earlier meeting with another in-house counsel about the results of the worker’s 
compensation trial), and refused to answer questions about what Nissan considered in dropping its 
appeal of the worker’s compensation case, the Court cannot conclude that the Magistrate Judge 
clearly erred or acted contrary to law when he refused Plaintiff’ s request to have Coss answer such 
questions.
C. MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 19, 2008 (Docket Entry No. 81).
The September 19, 2008 Order of the Magistrate Judge deals with four e-mail “strings” 
allegedly discovered by Dr. Anne Kubina (“Dr. Kubina”) while cleaning out a briefcase. Dr. 
Kubina, who was an on-site contract physician at Nissan’s Smyrna, Tennessee plant, turned those 
e-mail “strings” over to defense counsel on the morning of September 18, 2008. Defense counsel 
promptly provided a redacted copy of the e-mail “strings” to Plaintiff’ s counsel, and both redacted 
and unredacted copies to the Magistrate Judge. After a telephone conference, the Magistrate Judge 
reviewed those e-mails and others to determine whether the redacted portions of the e-mails were 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. In the September 19, 2008 Order, the Magistrate Judge 
found that the redactions by Defendant were justified as communications subject to the attorney- 
client privilege.
Plaintiff asserts two objections to the September 19, 2008 Order. Plaintiff claims that the 
e-mails should not have been redacted because Defendant allegedly waived the attorney-client
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privilege and in support of that contention sets forth the same arguments raised with regard to Coss’ 
deposition testimony. For the reasons explained in the preceding section, that argument is rejected.
Plaintiff also argues that the following messages should not have been redacted: (1) e-mail 
transmittal message dated July 25, 2006 from Miles Tate to Doniela Fiato; (2) e-mail transmittal 
message dated July 5, 2006 from Miles Tate to Gina Davidson; and (3) e-mail transmittal message 
dated June 27, 2006 from Miles Tate to Susan Midgett. Miles Tate, Doniela Fiato, and Susan 
Midgett are all adjusters of ESIS, Nissan’s worker’s compensation carrier. Since none of the 
individuals in the e-mails are attorneys and none of the messages were even copied to counsel for 
Nissan, Plaintiff claims the Magistrate Judge erred in upholding the redactions with respect to those 
e-mails.
The Court does not find that the Magistrate Judge clearly erred or acted contrary to law in 
concluding that Defendant was justified in its redaction of those e-mails. At the time the e-mails 
were sent, Plaintiff’ s worker’s compensation trial had just concluded and Defendant was obviously 
weighing its legal strategy with respect to a potential appeal of Chancellor Smith’s ruling. While 
none of the authors or recipients of the e-mails were counsel for Nissan, each of the e-mails in 
question was a forward of an e-mail from Coss who was acting as in-house counsel for Nissan. Each 
of the e-mails contain the thought processes and work product of Coss, and recommends a course 
of action based upon counsel’s legal opinion. One of the e-mails additionally contains the thought 
process of outside counsel and opinions about the proper course of action. While ESIS is 
independent of Nissan, it is its worker’s compensation carrier and, as such, had a common interest 
with Nissan in relation to Plaintiff’ s worker’s compensation case. See, Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.
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v. Excess Ins. Co., 197 F.R.D. 601, 606-07 (S.D. Ohio 2000)(collecting cases)(“under the related
‘common interest rule,’ attorneys or parties facing a common litigation opponent may exchange 
privileged communications without waiving the privilege”); Gibson v. Richardson, 2003 WL 
135054 at * 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)(“participants in a joint defense may communicate among 
themselves and with their attorneys on matters of common legal interest for the purpose of 
coordinating their joint legal strategy”). Accordingly, the Court will overrule this objection.
II. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’ s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order of 
September 19, 2008 (Docket Entry No. 85) will be denied, as will Plaintiff’ s Objection to the 
Magistrate Judge’s Order of September 17, 2008 (Docket Entry No. 90). The Magistrate Judge’s 
Order of September 17, 2008 (Docket No. 77) and the Magistrate Judge’s Order of September 19, 
2008 (Docket Entry No. 81) will be accepted and affirmed.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
ROBERT L. ECHOLS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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